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William H. Oakland*
California's voters recently enacted a revolu-
tionary measure for reducing the level and
growth of state-and-local government expendi-
ture, and for sharply restricting the use of the
property tax as a source ofgovernment revenue.
The Jarvis-Gann Amendment (Proposition 13):
(1) restricts the propertytax rateto no morethan
one percent of assessed value; I (2) sets assessed
value for a property which has not been trans-
ferred since 1975-76 equal to its 1975-76 fair-
market value plus two percent per year
(compounded)-or in the case of subsequent
transfer, sets assessed value equal to market
value at time ofsale plus the two-percentgrowth
factor; and (3) requires that new taxes or in-
creases in existing taxes (except property taxes)
receive a two-thirds approval ofthe legislature in
the case of state taxes, or ofthe electorate in the
case of local taxes.2
These provisions have had an enormous fiscal
impact. First, the rate limitation alone cut
property-tax collections by half,3 since the effec-
tive rate ofproperty tax previously had averaged
about 2.5 percent statewide. Moreover, the re-
duction was accentuated by the fact that the
rollback ofassessments applied toa period when
property values had escalated rapidly. Hence,
the overall impact amounted to a 57-percent ($7
billion) reduction in property-tax receipts. This
constituted nearly 20 percent of the total reve-
nues raised by all levels of California govern-
ments, and 37 percent of the revenues raised by
local governments alone.
Before the fact, Proposition 13's critics had
predicted disastrous fiscal consequences from
such a massive reduction in local-government
revenues. They predicted a loss of more than
200,000 public-sector jobs, on the assumption
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that slightly more than half ofthe lost $7 billion
would have been spent on payroll (the national
average is 57 percent). Thetotalemploymentloss
was estimated at 400,000 publicand privatejobs,
allowing for such indirect effects as the money
public employees would no longer spend.
Equally important, the critics predicted that a
massive disruption of public services would
accompany the revenue shortfall. San Francisco
officials, for example, estimated that outlays on
police and fire services would be cut by one-
third, the budget for libraries cut by 80 percent,
the city zoo entirely eliminated, and funds for
other recreation and cultural activities reduced
by two-thirds.4 These dire forecasts have not yet
materialized, because of substantial State
relief-and because ofa number ofother factors
discussed in this paper. However, the critics
argue that severe consequences can still be ex-
pected, since theState programwas onlyenacted
for one year and the surplus from which it was
financed may not recur.
While Proposition 13's employment and
public-expenditure effects have received the
most attention, numerous other ramifications
also demand attention. The amendment, for
example, has major implications for financial
markets, for individual taxpayers, for the hous-
ing market, for state and local governments,and
perhaps, most dramatically, for the Federal
Government. Because of this complexity, it
would be foolish to attempt a comprehensive
evaluation in the space available here. Instead,
the paper will focus upon three broad questions
or tssues:
1. What was the general fiscal climate during
the period in which the amendment was formu-
lated and debated?
2. To what extent will Proposition 13 succeed
in reducing the size and growth of California's
public expenditures?3. What does the amendment imply for Cali-
fornia's future revenue structure?
The answer to the first question shouldhelp to
resolve a basic controversy-was Proposition
13's success due to fiscal conditions characteris-
tic ofstate-and-local governments in general, or
was it simply a response to fiscal tensions unique
to California? The evidence presented below
supports the latter position. More specifically,
we argue that California's fiscal climate in the
pre-Proposition 13 period was characterized by:
a) a heavy and growing state-and-Iocal tax bur-
den during a period when such burdens had
levelled offin most otherstates; b) a massive shift
of property taxes towards homeowners; and c) a
rapidly expanding State budget surplus.
Although difficult to quantify, each factor
undoubtedly contributed to Proposition 13's
emergence and eventual adoption. More impor-
tantly, however, the second and third factors
were almost unique to California. The fact that
other states considered similar measures, there-
fore, is more a reflection of their attempt to
replicate California's "success" with voter-
induced tax reduction than a response to similar
fiscal pressures. Largely for this reason, Califor-
nia'sexperience provideslittleguidancefor other
communities. For example, unless they amass a
substantial budget surplus somewhere in the
state-local fiscal system, as California has done,
they cannot avoid painful disruptions in public
services.
This leads us to the second question-the
impact on the size and growth ofpublicexpendi-
ture. Some Proposition 13 advocates have ar-
gued that oneofits majoreffects will bea curbon
the growth of the public sector. Our evidence
suggests that such effects are and will continueto
be relatively minor. Specifically, in its first year,
Proposition 13 reduced the level of public serv-
ices by roughly 3 percent, and in subsequent
years, it may reduce the growth rate of public
services by less than I percentage point. Such
results primarily reflect the significant earlier
build-up in the State government's budget sur-
plus, the highly responsive character ofthe State
revenue system, and the substantial growth ex-
pected in future property-tax revenues.
Despite this small expenditureimpact, Propo-
sition 13 has affected the revenue structure of
California governments in a major way. Because
it largely substitutes State revenues for local
revenues, the share oflocal-governmentexpend-
itures financed by local sources has dropped
precipitously. This has obviousconsequencesfor
home rule. In addition, the progressivityofthe
state-local revenue system has increased, because
State revenue sources tend to be more progres-
sive than the local property tax. Finally, proper-
ty-tax proceeds have come to be shared, on a
defacto basis, bylocal-government unitswithin a
county area. In effect, Proposition 13 has intro-
duced tax-base sharing at the county level. This
important (although unintended) effect has
tended to strengthen fiscally weak jurisdictions
(e.g., central-city governments) at the expenseof
the more affluent (e.g., suburbs).
Total state-local tax burden
California governments collected $20.8 billion
in taxes in fiscal year 1975-76, more than their
counterparts in any otherstate.sCalifornia's per
capita tax collection of $965 placed it behind
I. Califomia Tax Climate
In this section we focus upon three major only Alaska ($1,896) and New York ($1,139).
facets ofCalifornia'sfiscal climate: (1) the behav- Accordingly, per capita taxes in Californiastood
ior of the total state-local tax burden over the 32 percent above the national average and 44
past two decades; (2) the behavior ofthe relative percent above the state median. In relation to
property-tax burden ofowner-occupied residen- personal income, a similar picture emerges.
tial property; (3) the recent growth ofthe State Californians paid 14.9 percent of their personal
surplus and fiscal prospects for the near-term income in !975-76, ranking behind only New
future. York and Vermont residents-and standing 19
percent above the national average. Thus, re-
gardless of the measure, California emerges as a
high-tax state.
Additionally, the tax burden has increased
sharply in recent years. Without Proposition 13,
California governments would have absorbed
8nearly 16 percent of the state's personal income years. But where would we expect those pres-
in fiscal year 1978-79, as compared to 9.3 percent sures to erupt? The sharpest increase in recent
in 1957-anincrease ofmorethan6.5 percentage years has occurred in property taxes, especially
points. (Table A.l andChart I). Forthe U.S. as a those affecting homeowners. Thus, it is not
whole, this measure also increased during the surprising that the taxpayer chose this particular
period, but at a much less rapid pace. Thus, the avenue for tax reduction.
differentialbetween Californiaandtherest ofthe The property tax plays a major role in the
nation widened from I percentage point to more California tax structure, comprising approxi-
than 4 percentage points over the past two mately 41 percent oftotal state-localtaxrevenue
decades, with much of that widening occurring in 1975-76.7 The corresponding figure for the
just within the past five years. While the effective U.S. as a whole is 36 percent.8 And since Califor-
tax rate elsewhere actually decreased slightly nia is a high tax state, its property-tax burden is
during the seventies, California's effective rate relatively high. In per capita terms, California's
continued to grow as rapidly as before. This 1975-76 property tax receipts of $415 stood 47
suggests that California has gotten out of step percent above the national norm, and were
with the rest of the country in recent years. surpassed only by New Jersey ($446) and Alaska
Proposition 13 may thus reflect taxpayers' ($1,048).9 As a share of personal income, the
attempts to bringtheirgovernment backintoline relevant figures are 6.4 percent for California
with historic relationships.6 But even after the and 4.5 percent for the nation as a whole (see
adoption of the amendment, as Table A.I indi- Appendix Table A.2 and Chart I). Theintroduc-
cates, California's tax rate remains above the tion of General Revenue Sharing narrowed this
average for the rest of the nation. gap in the early seventies, but it widened again
Property tax burdens after 1973.
Consequently, significant pressures for tax The growing burden was especially heavy for
relief have developed in California during recent homeowners. In the absence of Proposition 13,
Chart 1
Property Taxes, and Total State-Local Taxes,






















Source: u.s. Bureau of Census; 1977-79 data estimated by author (see Tables A.1 and A.21. Effect
of Proposition 13 not shown on chart.
9fiscal year 1978-79. Given a 9-percentannualrate
of property appreciation-a conservative
estimate-and given a continuation ofthe recent
pace of construction activity, the single-family
share of assessments (without Proposition 13)
would have risen to about 48.6 percent in the
year 1981-82. (Incontrast, the combinedshareof
assessments, for homeowners and renters alike,
amounted to only 47 percent for the nation as a
whole in 1975.)12 In the space ofonlyseven years,
then, the homeowner's share ofthe property tax
would have risen 54 percent.
Therefore, it is not surprising that California's
taxpayer revolt focussed upon property-tax re-
duction. The property-tax burden generally was
heavier than elsewhere, and in addition, the
rapid escalation ofreal-estate prices had created
a massive shift of the property-tax burden to-
ward homeowners. As a class, homeownerswere
made better off by the capital gains on their
homes, but most were not in a position to realize
them. Consequently, a large number of home-
owners found themselves with property-tax bills
doubling and even tripling without a corre-
sponding increase in their income flow. Thus
considerable pressures arose for some form of
property-tax relief.
the share of property taxes accounted for by
single-family dwellings would have risen from 32
percent in 1973-74 to 44 percent in 1978-79
(Table A.3 and Chart 2). Thus, relative to total
state personal income, homeowner property
taxes increased 38 percent over the same peri-
od. IO The single-familyshareoftotalassessments
had been relatively constant during the sixties
and early seventies, despite substantial adjust-
ments in the shares of other types of property.
Indeed, an increase in the homeowner's exemp-
tioncaused the shareto dip momentarilyin 1973-
74, but then it began a rapid rise because ofan
unparalleled boom in the single-family housing
market. Prices for existing homes in the San
Francisco area, for example,jumped 120 percent
between April 1973 and April I978-roughly 18
percent a yearll-and the Los Angeles area
experienced even faster growth. The price up-
surge could not be attributed to inflation alone,
since the GNP price deflator increased only 55
percent over the same five-year period. The
boom was confined primarily to single-family
housing, and did not spill over into nonresiden-
tial building.
Because reassessment in California is conduct-
ed on a three-year cycle, the full effects of the
housingprice upsurge had not yet beenfelt bythe
Chart 2
Single-Family Dwellings: Share of Property Taxes,
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Source: California Board of Equalization; author'sestimatesfor 1976-79 (see Table A.3).
10Table 1
BUdget Surplus of the State of California,








a Does not allowfor $4,100 million Proposition 13 reliefand
temporary income-tax cut of$1,000 million, both for fiscal
year 1978-79.
Source: (1975-76) and (1976-77), California Legislature,
Analysis ofthe Budget Bill, July I, 1978 to June 30,
1978; (1977-78) to (1979-80) San Francisco Chroni-
cle. August 25, 1978.
sonal income, of course, are highly sensitive to
aggregate economic conditions. But as the econ-
omy approaches full-employment, revenue in-
creases from these sources should slow down.
However, one other factor tends to keep state
revenue growth above thatofpersonal income--
inflation. Since the State'spersonalincome taxis
steeply progressive over a wide range, increases
in income due to inflation generate dispropor-
tionately large increases in tax receipts. Specifi-
cally, the elasticity of the State income tax with
State budget surplus
No story about California's fiscal climate
would be complete without a discussion of the
budget surplus accumulated bythe Stategovern-
ment in the past several years. Without the
passage of Proposition 13 and its impact on the
1978-79 budget, the cumulative surplus would
have grown to at least $10.1 billion by 1979-80
(Tablel)l3. That amount would have been al-
most as great as the combined yield ($11 billion
in 1979) ofthe State'stwo majorrevenue sources,
the personal income tax and the general sales
tax. 14
The growth in the State surplus reflects a
virtual explosion of California tax revenues
(Table 2). Between 1975-76 and 1977-78, three of
the State's major revenue sources showed growth
rates of43 percent or more, anda fourth grew by
about one-third. Overall, growth of revenues
amounted to a staggering 40 percent. More
impressively, this growth was accomplished
without any rate increases and was accompanied
by an increase ofonly23 percentinstate personal
income. In the aggregate, the latter implies a
revenue elasticity of 1.75. Although State ex-
penditures also grew rapidly over the same
period (27 percent), this growth was not suffi-
cient to prevent the accumulation ofa consider-
able surplus.
The rapid growth ofState-tax revenues can be
explained in part by the rapid recovery of the
national and regional economies from the severe
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Item: California Personal Income 23
Sources: U. S. Bureau of the Census, Governmental Finances; Economic Report ofthe Governor, 1978.
11a For derivation see text. No allowance is made for State
relief or tax-cut programs enacted for fiscal year 1978-79.
Table 3
Projected BUdget Surplus of
the State of California
1978-79 to 1983-84
($ millions)
this amounted to resistance to abnormally high
levels ofgovernment expenditure. 16 At the same
time, the combination ofeconomic recoveryand
inflation had produced a substantial budgetary
surplus which, if left unchecked, would have
soon grown to unreasonable proportions.
Hence, pressures were building to bring taxes
back into line with expenditure. Finally, a boom
in the single-family housing market produced a
sharp jump in the homeowner's share of the
property-tax burden. Thus, there was consider-
able pressure to provide tax relief to this subset
of taxpayers. 17
Proposition 13, then, was California'smethod
ofdealing with these diverse pressures. Itaccom-
plished the necessary tax reduction, and at the
same time provided a change in tax structure
designed to promote equity. This is not to say,
however, that the amendment was the optimal
way of achieving these goals. The fact that no
provision was made for a redistribution oftaxes
from the State to localgovernmentsthreateneda
considerable disruption in the delivery ofpublic
services. However, given thediverse objectivesto
be served and differences of interests among
voters, a comprehensive approach may not be
proven politically feasible. Moreover, the State
didredirect substantial revenues to localgovern-
ment. Viewed in this light, Proposition I3 was
successful in liquidating the State surplus.
respect to personal income has averaged about
1.7 over the last decade. This means that for
everyone-percent inflation-induced growth in
personal income, incometaxes have increased by
1.7 percent- a 0.7-percent bonus for the State.
At inflation rates of7to 8percent,this translates
into an additional 5-percent real increase in the
State government's revenue.
Inflation makes the short-term outlook for
State revenue growth particularly bright. Con-
tinued inflation should enable the State to sus-
tain personal-income growth of II percent, its
average for the past five years. If the growth of
other tax revenue matches the growth of per-
sonal income, total tax reveI1ue could expand
13.5 percent per year-nearly doubling within
five years. 15 More importantly, if State Govern-
ment expenditures grow in proportion to State
personal income, the budget surplus would con-
tinue to expand. By the year 1983-84, the annual
surplus would rise to $6.3 billion, and the cumu-
lative surplus to more than $30 billion (Table 3).
In other words, the budget surplus would grow
to untenable levels without some action to re-
duce taxes. Of course the State government
could increase expenditures more rapidly than
the II percent assumed in our projections. But
this would run counter to the national trend-a
falling share of income absorbed by state and
local taxes (see Table A.I). The State,
alternatively, could provide greater financial
relief to local governments, but this would only
shift the locus of the surplus. Tax reduction of
some form appears inevitable. Indeed, this helps
explain the recent one-time-only State income
tax cut of $1 billion, at a time when governlllent
finances were supposedly in a state of crisis. A
glance at Table 3 suggests that this actionwas no
more than a "drop in the bucket."
Three major factors
We can now weave together the three major
strands ofour fiscal-climate story. Not only were
taxes considerably higher in California than
elsewhere, but they were also diverging from the
national norm. Pressures therefore were devel-



























More than anything else, Proposition 13 has and control the growth ofgovernment spending.
been interpreted as a measure to reduce the level In this section, we offer quantitative estimatesof
12the expenditure impacts of the amendment in
both the short and medium term. It will be seen
that the pre-electionestimateswere grosslyexag-
gerated, and that Proposition 13's impact on the
size of California's public sector has been rela-
tively modest. (For those readers who wish to
skip the sometimes complex detail, the main
conclusions are summarized in the last part of
this section.)
Early estimates of impact
As noted earlier, theJarvis-GannAmendment
initially had been expected to reduce local-
government property-tax revenues by 57 percent
($7 billion) in fiscal year 1978-79. This would
imply a 23-percent reduction in local expendi-
tures, allowing for the fact that the property tax
produced 40 percent of all local revenues. A
reduction of such magnitude was not required,
however, because the State government, by
liquidating some of its surplus, allocated $4.1
billion in direct assistance and $0.9 billion in
emergency loans to local governments. Actually,
the State relief package amounted to only $4.1
billion, since no local units availed themselves of
the loan funds, which would have required
repayment in any case. With the $4.1 billion in
hand, local governments faced a projected reve-
nue shortfall of $2.9 billion in the first year after
the passage of Proposition 13-which implies a
9.5-percent reduction in total expenditures.
An across-the-board cut of 9.5 percent would
appear to be manageable, although somewhat
painful. However, the problem is complicated by
the fact that a large fraction oflocal expenditure
is outside the control of local authorities, be-
cause of Federal or Statemandatesand/orgrant
funds which are notfungible. Considerfor exam-
ple, public welfare. Halfofthewelfare program's
support comes from theState, and supportlevels
and eligibility requirements are determined by
Congress and the State Legislature. Hence, the
major discretion left to the localities lies with
administration, which amounts to less than 5
percent of total welfare outlay. IS And efforts to
trim administration may backfire, because pay-
ments to ineligible households could increase
without proper supervision. The problem is
further complicated by the legislative require-
ment that local communities maintain the qual-
13
ity of police and fire services as a condition for
receiving emergency State assistance.
For those reasons, uncontrollable expendi-
tures may amount to as much as 60 percent of
local budgets. Hence, the remaining 40 percent
would have to bear the full brunt of the $2.9-
billion revenue shortfall. This would involvecuts
of nearly 25 percent-not 9.5 percent-so that
serious disruptions could be expected to follow.
Despite these somber circumstances, local-
government employment dropped by only 7,000
workers duringJuly, thefirst month ofoperation
under Jarvis-Gann. 19 With a $2.9-billion short-
fall, local employment presumably eventually
would have had to drop by 80,000, more thanten
times what actually occurred. (Even though the
7,000 drop reflects onlythe first monthunderthe
amendment, its permanent character would re-
quire much of the adjustment to be made early.)
While local governments undoubtedly have
some flexibility in substituting workers for other
inputs, reducing overtime, etc., a discrepancy of
73,000 could not be due to such factors. Rather,
the discrepancy must be explained in terms ofan
error in the official projection-in other words,
the $2.9-billion figure is a gross exaggeration of
the local-government revenue gap.
Impact on existing service levels
There are two ways to estimate Proposition
13's public-expenditure impact. The first is to
compare public-service levels with those which
had prevailed in fiscal year 1977-78, the year
prior to implementation oftheamendment. This
comparison would help measure the magnitude
of the disruption in the flow of public services
resulting from the action. A second approach is
to compare public services with whattheywould
have been in the absence of Proposition 13,
which should enable us to discern the expendi-
ture impact of the amendment. Clearly the two
measures will be the same if the level of public
services remains constant over time. However,
some growth in public services has been occur-
ring and can be reasonably expected to continue
into the future. Forthese reasons, bothmeasures
are examined below.
First, consider the impact on the existing level
ofpublic services. Betweenthe 1977-78 and 1978-
79 fiscal years, Proposition 13 was expected toTable 4
Reduction in the Average level of
local Public Services Caused by
Proposition 13
($ millions)
reduce local-government revenues by. $6,048
million (Table 4). From this must first be sub-
tracted the Statereliefpackageof$4,100 million.
But a second adjustment must be made for the
fact that officials underestimated actual
property-tax collections for 1978-79. Because of
the rollback in assessments required by. the
amendment, officials projected the growth of
assessments at only 1.3 percent, as compared to
the 12.5 percentwhich would have beenexpected
in the absence of Proposition 13.20 In fact, fiscal
1978-79 assessments increased by a healthy 9
percent.
This discrepancy reflected the fact that, de-
spite a three-yearreassessmentcycle, manyprop-
erties had been underassessed relative to their
1975-76 values as late as the Springof1978, when
the rolls for the 1978-79 fiscal year were taken.
Furthermore, because of the assessment lag,
many of the properties transferred during the
1975-78 period had not been reassessed at their
value at time of sale. Since market values had
escalated rapidly during this period, the degree
of underassessment would be considerable. In
Changes in Local Revenues
Caused by Proposition 13
1977-78 Property Tax Collection
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Total
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both such cases, Proposition 13 allows assessors
to adjust prevailingassessmentsfor pasterrors-
and as a result, a large number of properties
showed higher assessments after larvis-Gann
passed than they would have in its absence.21
Consequently, property-tax revenues in fiscal
1978-79 will be $405 million higher than initially
projected.22
A further adjustment must be made to allow
for the growth of non-property tax revenues.
Since the latter are not directly affected by the
amendment, we assume that theywillgrowby 10
percent between 1977-78 and 1978-79-their
average rate ofgrowth since 1974-75.23 This will
produce an additional $1,716 million for use in
1978-79. Thus, the net change over the year in
tota/local government revenue amounts to $173
million.
To complete this calculation, we must com-
pute the growth of revenues which would have
been necessary to sustain 1977-78 public-service
levels. With an 8-percent expected rate ofinfla-
tion, a revenue increase of$2,288 million would
be necessary to maintain services. However, as
part of its relief measure, the State Legislature
prohibited cost-of-living adjustments for local-
government employees, so that extra revenues
would be needed only for the increased costs for
materials and supplies. Since wages comprise 55
percent of total expenditures, the requisite in-
crease is only $1,030 million.24 Thus, the overall
revenue deficiency is $857 million ($173 million
less $1,030 million), or 2.8 percent.
It could be argued that the wage freeze will
have to be made up sooner or later, and should
therefore be excluded from consideration. This
objection would be valid if local governments
purchased labor services on competitive mar-
kets. However, wages in California's public
sector run 23 percent above the national ayer-
age,25 while wages in its private (manufacturing)
sector run only 9 percent above the national
average. It would seem, therefore, that Califor-
nia's public-sector workers could live witha one-
year wage freeze, because theirwages are consid-
erably above those dictated by a free market.
In summary, Proposition 13's actualeffect was
only a 2.8-percent reduction rather than the 23-
percent initially-estimated shortfall in local-
government revenues. Even allowing for the factTableS
Local Public Expenditure Before
and After Proposition 13 (1978-79)
($ millions)
without Jarvis-Gann-only a 4.0 percent short-
fall from projected 1978-79 revenues. That cut-
backseems modest, indeed, whencompared with
the figures seen in the popular press-or when
compared with what Proposition l3's supporters
had hoped to achieve.
Future service-level impacts
Even though the first-year expenditureimpact
is minimal, it could be argued that Proposition
13 will still have a major impact in subsequent
years. This view is based uponseveralconsidera-
tions: (I) the State relief package was fora single
year only; (2) the State surplus from which
existing relief was drawn will be depleted in
future years; and (3) the amendment's restric-
tions on assessments will inhibit the future
growth of property-tax receipts.
A crucial question concerns the magnitude of
surplus State funds, which helps determine the
availability and the extent offuture State assis-
tance. Some analysts believe only modest
amounts will be available, especially since the
surplus available to the State Legislature in July
1978 was the result of several years' accumula-
tion. However, there is ample reason to believe
that the State could continue or even increase
that mandated programs pushed the bruntofthe
adjustment upon 40 percent of local govern-
ments' budgets, the implied reduction amounted
to 7.0 percent for those activities subject to cuts.
Suchan adjustment wouldseemtobeachievable
without majordisruptions. Andsince manylocal
governments responded to the revenue shortfall
by imposing new schedules offees, muchof the
remaining reduction may yet be avoided.26
The employment data cited above are consis-
tent with this finding of ~nlysmall impact ofthe
Jarvis-Gann amendment on the level of public
services. Further support is provided by the
budget ofthe City and CountyofSanFrancisco.
Although accounting procedures make year-to-
yearcomparisons difficult, San Francisco'stotal
budget showed only an $8-million decline, to
$823 million, for fiscal 1978-79. Moreover, the
budget for permanent employees' salaries
remained unchanged from a year earlier-
implying no layoffs. Furthermore, the City re-
scinded several emergencytaxmeasures adopted
at the time the amendment was first passed-
which would hardlyimplyfiscal distress. Finally,
there is some evidence that the City actually
budgeted a considerablesurplus for the year.27, 28
Impact on 1978-79 service levels
To determine the amendment's impact on
1978-79 planned local expenditures, we must
calculate the loss of local revenue caused by
Proposition 13 plus any State-mandated ex-
penditure cutbacks (Table 5).29 According to
official estimates, the 1978-79 property-taxreve-
nue loss amounts to $12,448 million, but from
this we subtract State reliefand the property-tax
receipts not officially anticipated. The resulting
figure, $2,469 million, is thus a first approxima-
tion of the reduction in local-government reve-
nues from what would have prevailed without
the amendment.
This figure overstates the impact on public
services, however, because it fails toallowforthe
wage freeze imposed by the State Legislature.
This action freed up funds which could be used
forother purposes, and is thus tantamount to a
State grant to local governments of an amount
equal to the wage savings. Hence, it must be
subtractedfrom therevenueshortfall. Thisyields
a net reduction in public services of $1,281
million from the level that would have prevailed
15
Changes in Local Revenues
Caused by Proposition 13
Officially Estimated 1978-79
Property Tax Collections
Officially Estimated 1978-79 Property
Tax Collections Under Proposition 13
Less:
State Relief
Additional Property Tax because of
Higher Assessments
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4.0%existing levels of assistance without increasing
tax rates. To analyze this possibility, we project
the State surplus under two alternative sets of
assumptions about the growth of personal in-
come and State relief. The first assumes growth
rates of 12 percent and 10 percent, respectively;
the second uses 10 percent and 8 percent.
How valid are these assumptions? While 12-
percent personal-income growth is slightly high-
er than the II percent experienced over the past
five years, the recent upsurge in inflation makes
such an assumption quite plausible. The 10-
percent growth in aid, on the other hand, would
correspond to the pre-Proposition 13 average
growth of property-tax receipts. If State. aid
grows at a 10-percent rate, therefore, anyreduc-
tion in the growthoflocal expenditureswould be
the result ofthe failure oflocally raised revenues
to keep pace with the growth they would have
experienced without the amendment. The sec-
ond set ofassumptions is moreconservative. The
10-percent personal-income growth figure has
been surpassed every year since 1973, and the 8-
percent growth of State aid would do nothing
more than maintain the realvalue ofreliefunder
present inflationary conditions.
State expenditures are assumed to grow at the
rate of personal income, while revenues growat
the same rate multiplied by the revenueelasticity,
following the procedure used for Table 5. How-
ever, we must also adjust for two post-
Proposition 13 developments-the one-time-
only tax cut of $1 billion, and the indexation of
income-tax brackets for the first three percent-
age points of inflation. Hence, we reduce the
elasticity ofthe income tax from 1.7(as in Table
5) to a figure of 1.5, and thus obtain a total State
revenue elasticity of 1.166.
Under the first set ofassumptions, therefore,
the State can adequately fund the program
without an increase in tax rates (Table 6),30
Although annual expenditures would exceed
revenues between 1978-79 and 1984-85, the car-
ryover surplus would be sufficient to fund the
deficits-and thereafter, annual revenues would
begin to exceed expenditures. Under the second
set of assumptions, cumulative deficits would
begin to emerge in the mid-eighties, butthe $170-
million deficit in 1984-85 would amount to only
.006 percent of State revenue and 2.6 percent of
the State relief program. Since the deficit would
disappear by the following year, the program
appears to be fundable.
Whether or not the State can offset a constant
proportion of local-government property-tax
losses, then, hinges critically upon the growth of
Table 6














Assumption A Assumption B
Yearly Cumulative Yearly Cumulative
Surplus Surplus Surplus Surplus
-$1,800a $2,000 -$ 1,800a $2,000
-468 1,532 516 1,484
-427 1,105 474 1,010
372 733 420 590
-298 435 354 236
203 232 -271 35
-83 149 -170 -205
65 214 49 -254
n.c. n.c. 96 -158
Assumption A: 12-percent growth of State personal income and !O-percent growth of State aid.
Assumption B: IO-percent growth of State personal income and 8-percent growth of State aid.
n.c.Not calculated
a Rellects a $I-billion tax cut for 1978-79 only.
*Source: see derivation in text.
16personal income. If this growth is as high as 12
percent, theState can meet its objective without
an increase in statutory tax rates. If,onthe other
hand, income growth is only 10 percent, aid can
grow at only 8 percent per year. In otherwords,
relief would fall 2 percentage points below the
level necessary to keep local public expenditures
growing at the rate which would have prevailed
in the absence ofProposition 13. 31
Another crucial question concerns the poten-
tial problems caused by the amendment's 2-
percent annual limit on property reassessments
(unless the property is transferred). On its face,
this might seem to limit property-tax revenue to
2-percentannualgrowth,butsuch is notthecase.
The growth of property-tax receipts will reflect
the degree ofunderassessment as of 1978-79, the
rate of increase of property values, the turnover
rate of existing property, and the rate of new
construction.
COIlsider, first, the growth of residential-
property assessments. As the appendix shows,
aggregate assessments for existing houses could
grow at a rate equal to 90 percent ofthe underly-
ing appreciation rate ofhousingprices in thefirst
year following the reassessment limitation.
Moreover, in subsequent years, assessments
could continue tb increase until reaching the
appreciation rate. Thus, if housing values are
increasing at a 10-percent annual rate, the as-
sessed value ofthe housing stock in place during
1978-79 will grow by 9 percent in 1979-80. These
results are based on two assumptions, both of
which conform with recent experience-a 25-
percent initial under-assessment of the existing
housing stock, relative toits 1978-79 value, anda
15-percent annualturnoverrate ofexistinghous-
ing. 32
The rapid increase in the assessed value ofthe
existi~ghousing stock reflects the much larger
(although less frequent) reassessment of homes
under the amendment. Forexample, ifa house is
sold everyseven years and housingpricesgrowat
10 percent per year, the assessed value ofsuch a
house will double at the time of sale. If, onthe
other hand, the house were assessed annually,
the increase in assessment would be only 10
percent each year, leadingto the same result over
time. Thus, Proposition 13 would cause a much
smaller reduction in the growth of the assessed
17
value ofexisting homes than perhaps some ofits
framers intended. We must also consider the
growth caused by new construction, which
amounts each year to between 2 and 4 percentof
California's existing housing stock. If housing
prices rise 10 percent per year, which is modest
by recent standards, the total residential-
propertytax base will then increase by II to 13
percent per year, not much below its recent
performance.
The situation is much different with non-
residential properties, which are transferred
much less frequently than housing. Hence, the
taxable base for this class of property probably
will grow at aboutthe 2-percent allowableannu-
al rate, plus any growthdue to new construction,
which normally accounts for about 2 percent of
the existing stock. Thus, we could expect the
non-residential property tax base to rise about 4
percent annually.
The total property-tax base, given our as-
sumptions about the growth of the (relatively
comparable) residential and non-residential
components, could increase annually by 71;2
percent to 81;2 percent-say 8 percent. This is
only 2 percentage points below whatwould have
been expected without Proposition 13. But this
gap will now pose a much less serious problem
than before, because the property tax now ac-
counts for only 20 percent of total local-
government revenues, as compared with 40 per-
cent in the pre-amendment period. This means
that the annual revenue shortfall caused by the
reassessment provision should amount to only
0.4 percent-scarcely a startling effect.
Under our assumption of 10-percent annual
growth in state aid, the reduction in the growth
of public expenditure would reflect the reassess-
ment provision alone--only 0.4 percent. But
with 8-percent annual growth in state aid, the
total reduction will be 0.7 percent.33 By either
standard, the reduction appears insignificant in
relation to the IO-percent anticipated annual
growth in local public expenditures.
Overall impact
Altogether, Proposition 13 has had, and will
probably continue to have, only minor effects
upon the size of California's public sector.
Public-service levels in 1978-79 are only about
2.8 percent below those prevailing in the yearbefore the amendment took effect~oronly
about 4.0 percent below ifallowance is made for
increases in public services which would have
occured in the absence of Jarvis-Gann. The
future expenditure effect, on the otherhand,will
hinge largely upon what happens to the State
relief program. Since the State will probably
continue to amass surpluses, it will probably
continue to make aid available to local govern-
ments. The major source of expenditure con-
straint, however, will be the slowdown in the
growth of property-tax revenues. But even this
shortfall should amount to only 0.4-0.6 percent
ofthe total revenue requirement oflocalgovern-
ments. And in view of the availability of other
revenue sources-suchas charges,fees, andwage
taxes-even this minor shortfall could be
resolved.
Two caveats are in order, however. First, our
calculations were done entirely at the aggregate
level, whereas some individual governmentunits
could experience considerable reductions in ex-
penditure. Secondly, no allowance was madefor
the possibility of recession. A major recession
could wipe out much of the carryover surplus
which is providingthefunding for the Staterelief
program. However, even during the 1975 reces-
sion, California personal income grew by 1012
percent-which is above our minimum-growth
assumption. This reflected the inflation which
kept nominal incomes rising in the face ofreces-
sion. Since substantial inflation could continue
for the next four or five years, even the occur-
rence of a recession during this period need not
invalidate our conclusions.
III. TaX Structure Impact
In contrast to Proposition 13's relatively actual reduction, however, because without the
minor impact upon the level of government amendment the State would probably have tak-
expenditure, it will have a substantial impact en steps to liquidate its surplus. With a $4.1-
upon the state-and-local tax structure, and also billion reduction in the surplus-the actual
upon the distribution ofrevenue-raising respon- amount of local relief-the local share ofstate-
sibility between the State and local governments local revenue would have been considerably
(Table 7). The local share of total revenues in higher, so by that standard Proposition 13 low-
1978-79 drops 12 percentage points, to 37 per- ered the local share by nearly 20 percentage
cent, as a result of the amendment. (In contrast, points. And the situation is even more dramatic
the national average share was 46 percent in for specific local functions. For example, the
1975-76.) This understates the extent of the share of education financed locally drops from
Table 7
State-local Division of Revenue Raising Responsibility
in California, 1978-79
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*Assumes $4.1 billion in State tax reduction.
Source: U.S. Bureau of Census, Government Finances. and estimates by the author.
1852 percent to 28 percent because of the amend-
ment,34 placing California belowall butsix other
states in this regard.35
Political theory suggests that the control of
publicexpenditureultimately rests with the body
which is responsible for raising the revenue. If
this is correct, Proposition 13 will lead toa major
shift towards State control. The prohibition
against employee cost-of-living increases and
against reductions in public safety may be just
the tip of the iceberg for future state interven-
tions. Local control or "home rule" could be-
come a thing of the past in California.36 Any
judgment here, however, must remain in the
realmofspeculation. Ourexperiencewith Feder-
al Revenue Sharing has shown that revenue-
raising and expenditure authority can at least
sometimes be kept separate.
Less uncertainty surrounds the tax-structure
consequences of Proposition 13, which tends to
substituteStatetaxsourcesforthelocal property
tax. More specifically, in the absence of this
measure, the State probably would have cut
income taxes.J7 Since the income tax tends to be
more progressive than the property tax, such a
substitution presumably would have favorable
equity consequences.38
Again, given the fact that income-tax reduc-
tion was the major alternative to Jarvis-Gann,
areas which are relatively property intensive
should now gain relativeto thoseareas which are
income intensive. Since cities and rural areas
have a larger share ofthe statewide property-tax
base than of the income-tax base, taxes conse-
quently would be shifted towards the suburbs.
Given the poor fiscal condition of many central
cities, such a shift would provide welcome relief.
Further relief for fiscally disadvantagedjuris-
dictions should come from a little-noticed fea-
ture of the State relief measure, which allocates
relief roughly in proportion to previous
property-tax collections.39 Because of the
massive reduction in property-taxreceipts, itwas
necessary to specify howthe remaining revenues
from this source were to be allocated. Basically,
the State Legislature decided to allocate these
proceeds among counties in proportion to their
total assessed valuation. This precluded inter-
county tax transfers. Within each county, how-
ever, tax proceeds were divided roughly in pro-
portion toprevious property-taxcollections; i.e.,
each local unit suffered the same percentage
revenue loss. If this arrangement is continued,
therefore, future increases in assessable base will
be shared by all units within a jurisdiction.
In effect, California has developed a system of
tax-base sharing similar to that in operation in
the Minneapolis-St. Paul area, whereby incre-
ments to the metropolitan tax baseareshared by
all local units within the urban area. (However,
the Twin City program is on a metropolitan
rather than county basis.) Base sharing has been
widely touted as a technique to cope with the
adverse fiscal consequences ofsuburbanization,
so that a central city does not suffer revenue
losses if its tax base moves to the suburbs.40
Moreover, the city reaps part of the benefit of
whatever net growth occurs in the metropolitan
area. Perhaps unwittingly, therefore, California
with Proposition 13 has radically changed fiscal
relationships in its metropolitan areas.41
In summary, the adoption of Proposition 13
may profoundly affect the system ofgovernance
ofCalifornia. On the one hand, it could lead toa
substantial loss in local control, while on the
other, it could significantly affect fiscal relation-
ships within metropolitan areas. Finally, it
should increase the equity of California taxes,
among persons and among political jurisdic-
tions.
IV. Summary and Conclusions
This paperhasshownthattheemergenceofthe
Jarvis-Gann Amendment cannot be attributable
to a single cause, but rather to several different
forces. First was a high and growing state-local
tax burden duringa periodwhen similarburdens
in other parts of the country were levelling off.
Second was a substantialshift in thedistribution
ofproperty-tax burdens towards homeownersat
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a time when inflation was already causing bud-
getary problems for many households. Lastly
was the emergence ofa significant Statesurplus
which, if left unchecked, would have grown to
unreasonable proportions.
Each ofthese factors contributed tothediffer-
entperspectives which voters had ofthe measure.
By placing a ceiling on the property-tax rate,restnctmg the growth of assessments, and
increasing the political majorities required for
new taxes, the amendment promised to restrict
the size and growth of the public sector. By
focusing tax reduction upon property.taxes, it
provided the relief sought by homeowners. And
finally, by placing local governments in an intol-
erable fiscal situation, it forced the State to
liquidate much of its surplus.
Proposition 13 apparentlyhasachieved twoof
its objectives-reduction of property taxes. and
liquidation ofstate surpluses-but to date it has
had only a minimal effect upon the growth of
public expenditures. In its first year, it required
only a 2.8-percent reduction in the average level
of public services; in the near future, barring a
major recession, it may have little effect unless
the State withholds the relief it can afford and
which it seems already committed to provide.
In effect, then, Proposition 13 emerges pri-
marily as a tax-reform measure-one which
shifts the emphasis from the property tax to the
income tax. Moreover, by shifting a major por-
tion oflocal revenue-raising responsibility tothe
State, the amendment may seriously erode local
control. The measure has also had some unin-
tended consequences for fiscal relations at the
local level, since the property taxes that remain
are to be shared ona county-widebasis. Thiswill
tend to augment the resources of fiscally weak
governments at the expense ofthe moreaffluent.
These unintended consequences aside, Propo-
sition 13 emerges as a unique California phe-
nomenon. The combination of factors which
gave it birth are unlikely to be matched in any
other state. The same can be said of its conse-
quences. The existence of a significant State
surplus has mitigated its potentially disruptive
impacts uponthedeliveryofpublicservices. This
carries an important lesson for other states that
have been considering measures similar to
Proposition 13. Unless a considerable surplus
already exists somewhere in their state-local
system, they cannot expect to matchthe relative-
ly smooth transition experienced by California.
Without such a surplus, their citizens and public
officials must be prepared to face considerable
disruptions in the flow of public services.
Appendix
Behavior of·Residential Investment
Under Proposition 13, the assessed valueofsuch
a home is equal to
Let Vet) be the market value ofa home whose
assessed value at t = (T-1978) = 0 is equal to k%
of its true market value. Furthermore, assume
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= (1 - d if
The expected assessment ofthe home at time t
is given by
t
~ pet, u)A(t, u).
u=o
Morever, since
-1 pet - I, u) = (l - s) pet, u)




\= (1.02)t kV(O) if u=O (2)
-1 A(t - I, u) = (1.02) A(t, u)
we can express (4) as
(6)
which is a first-order lineardifferentialequation.
Assume there are two classes of residential
property which differ only in their ratio of
assessed value to market value. The first class,
where u is the year of the last sale ofthe home.
Let the probability that a home is sold during a
given year be given byset), andassume.thats(t)=
s, forall 1. Thenthe probabilitythat,attimet, the
house would have last been sold (t- u) periods
earlier is given by
A(t) = (1.02)(l - s)A(t - I)
+ sY(O)(l + g)t, (7)
20(10)
denoted by the subscript 1, has an initial assess~
ment ratioof1, while theother,denoted by2, has
an initial ratio ofk. Then the expectedaggregate
assessed value is
where r is the aggregate assessment ratio at t = O.
Substituting from (11) and (12) into (10), and
setting t = 1, we obtain




State and Local Taxes
as a Percent of
Personal Income, 1957-78
Year California Other U.S. Difference
(1) (2) (1-2)
1957 9.31 8.14 1.17
1962 10.46 9.32 1.14
1963-64 12.07 10.13 1.94
1964-65 11.98 10.24 1.74
1965-66 12.47 10.43 2.04
1966-67 11.98 10.32 1.66
1967-68 13.37 10.49 2.88
1968-69 13.71 10.91 2.80
1969-70 13.38 11.44 1.96
1970-71 13.73 11.66 2.07
1971-72 14.94 12.42 2.52
1972-73 14.91 12.71 2.20
1973-74 14.01 12.16 1.85
1974-75 14.59 12.00 2.59
1975-76 14.89 12.17 2.72
1976-77 15.78c 12.38a 3.40
1977-78 15.96c 12.11 a 3.85
1978-79 15.97 c 11.93b 4.04
1978-79 12.64d 11.93b 0.71d
lim B(t) - B(t - 1)
=g
t- oo B(t-I)
Moreover, it is easy to show that if the same
condition holds
(12) r
B(t) = [wA1(t) + (1 - w)A2(t)] . N (8)
where w is the shareofhomes in class 1and N is
the number of homes. For convenience we nor-
malize so that N = 1.
Using (7), we can express (8) as
B(t) = (1.02) (1 - s)B(t - 1)
+sV(O)(I +g/ (9)
which has the solution
B(t) = [B(O) - (~)]at + (_b_)zt+l
z-a z-a
where
a = (1.02)(1 - s)
b = sV(O)
z = (1 + g)
Now let us normalize B such that
B(O) = wA1(0) + (1 - w)A2(0)




w+ (1 - w)k
Since we have set B(O) = 1, (11) represents one
plus the growthrate oftheaggregate assessments
for the first year. Choosing s= .15, g= .1, and r=
.75, yields B( 1) = 1.087. With r=.74, B(1) = 1.09.
It remains to examine the subsequent growth
ofB(t). Clearly, if1+g>(1 - s)(1.02), which is to
be expected,
Source: U.S. Bureau of Census, Government Finances
a Based on U.S. Commerce Departmentestimates, reported
in Survey (}f Current BuSiness.
b Sameas a, but first quarter 1978 used to project entireyear.
c 1976-78 tax receipts based on author's estimates using
California State Comptroller Repofts. Pefsonal income
for 1978 from Economic Report ofthe Governor, 1978.
d After Proposition 13.
21Table A.2
Property Taxes as a
Percent of Personal Income,
1957-78
Year California Other U.S. Difference Year California Other U.S. Difference
(1) (2) (1-2) (1) (2) (1-2)
1957 4.39 3.61 .70 1970-71 6.75 4.49 2.26
1962 5.61 4.17 1.44 1971-72 7.11 4.65 2.46
1963-64 6.04 4.41 1.63 1972-73 7.02 4.58 2.44
1964-65 5.93 4.43 1.50 1973-74 6.28 4.30 1.98
1965-66 6.26 4.44 1.82 1974-75 6.27 4.25 2.02
1966-67 6.16 4.28 1.88 1975-76 6.41 4.29 2.12
1967-68 6.19 4.21 1.98 1976-77 6.56a 4.18b 2.38
1968-69 6.33 4.26 2.07 1977-78 6.44a 4.09b 2.35
1969-70 6.27 4.36 1.91 1978-79 6.32a,c 3.97b 2.35
Source: U.S. Bureau of Census, Government Finances b Estimated using U.S. Commerce Dept. data.
a Estimated using State ofCalifornia data on property-tax c Without the passage of Proposition 13.
collections.
Table A.3
Distribution of Net* Assessed Value and Property Tax Burden
on Single-Family Dwellings in California,
1964-65 to 1978-79
Share of Total Net Assessed Value Share of
Property Taxes Taxes on Single-Family
Single-Family Other Non- State of Single-Family Dwellings as a Percent
Period Residences Residences Residential Assessedf Dwellings of Personal Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1964-65 34.8% 12.3% 40.8% 12.1% 36.2% 1.97%
65-66 34.5 12.6 41.4 11.5 34.8 2.01
66-67 34.0 13.3 41.8 10.9 35.3 2.04
67-68 33.6 13.7 42.6 10.1 35.0 2.05
68-69a 34.0 13.8 42.6 9.7 35.4 2.11
69-70b 32.2 14.4 44.0 9.5 33.5 1.98
70-71 c 33.5 14.8 42.9 8.8 34.8 2.24
71-72 33.7 14.5 43.8 8.1 35.0 2.37
72-73 34.0 13.9 44.4 7.6 35.2 2.35
73-74d 31.6 13.8 46.9 7.7 32.1 1.88
74-75e 32.9 13.4 46.4 7.3 33.9 1.98
75-76 35.2 13.2 44.7 6.9 36.2 2.16
76-77 39.5 12.9 41.0 6.6 40.4 2.48
77-78 41.0 12.6 39.6 6.7 42.2 2.53
78-79 43.0 12.6 38.3 6.4 44.3 2.60
* Net of exemptions
a First significant "~open space" assessments.
b Introduction of $750 homestead exemption; 15-percent inventory exemption.
c With 30-percent inventory exemption.
d With $1,750 homestead exemption; 45-percent inventory exemption.
e With 50-percent inventory exemption.
f State-assessed property is mainly personal property of utilities. Beginning in 1964 and ending in 1974, the assessment ratio
on this class was lowered until it reached the ratio applying to other classes.
Source: California Board of Equalization; author's estimates for years 1975-76 to 1978-79.
22FOOTNOTES
1. This rate limitation does not apply to the debt
service on outstanding debt.
2. This description ofthe Amendment is onlymeantto
be suggestive. For a more thorough discussion see the
Beebe article in this Review.
3. It is estimated that a levy of 1/4 percent would be
necessary initially to service outstanding debt.
4. "Analysis of the Fiscal Impact of the Proposed
Jarvis-Gann Amendment", Report to the Bureau of the
Budget to the Board of Supervisors, San Francisco,
March 1978. The unevenness of these cuts reflects the
fact that not all services are equally funded by the
property tax, as well as the existence of a myriad of
State and Federal mandates.
5. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Government Finances
in 1975-76.
6. This conjecture is rejected by the U.S. Congres-
sional Budget Office, which using unpublished data
concludes that tax burdens in California have been
growing about the same rate as elsewhere. Curiously, a
67 percent difference in growth rates of tax burden is
interpreted as a 2.2 percent differential (Le., 5.5 percent
vs 3.3 percent). See "Proposition 13: Its Impact on the
Nation's Economy, Federal Revenues, and Federal
Expenditures", Congressional Budget Office, July
1978.
7. U.S. Bureau of the Census, op. cit.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Since the homeowners' share of State personal
income is unknown it was not possible to construct an
index of homeowner tax burden per se. Nevertheless, if
income shares were constant over the period, the 30
percent figure is a measure of the increase in home-
owner burden.
11. Real Estate Research Council of Northern Califor-
nia, Northern California's Real Estate Report, Vol.
30/Number 1.
12. This figure for 1975 is the latest year for which
national data is available. While the California number
for that year is close to the national average, the recent
upsurge in residential share in California is unlikely to
be matched nationally because the boom in real estate
prices was much more pronounced in California than
elsewhere. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmen-
tal Relations, SignificantFeatures of Fiscal Federalism,
1976-77, Vol. II, p. 106.
13. The term "at least" is used because the State's
projections, from which our figures were drawn, have
proved markedly conservative in the past.
14. Economic Report of the Governor, 1978, Sacra-
mento, 1978, p. A-55.
15. To arrive at this figure, multiply the 11 percent by
1.7 to obtain the growth of Personal Income Tax
receipts.-18.Tpercent. Sincethe latteraccountsfor1/3
of total general revenue, the growth of total revenue is
simply (1/3 X 18.7) + (2/3 x 11.m = 13.5.
16. Although our argument has been couched in terms
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of taxes, it applies equally well to government expendi-
tures becausetaxesand expendituremovetogether. An
exception to the latter occurs after the 1977-78 fiscal
year when substantial surpluses emerge. However, the
gap between tax burdens in California and the rest of
the U.S. had already opened substantially by 1977-78.
17. Another element which may have played a role is
the Serrano decision on the finance ofelementary and
secondary education. To implement Serrano, the State
had planned to redistribute property taxes from rich to
poor districts. Such action was to begin in the fiscal
year 1978-79, but because of Proposition 13's restric-
tion on property tax receipts, it had to be tabled. One
might argue that support for Proposition 13 came from
those who saw the impending State action as eliminat-
ing the connection between their property tax pay-
ments and the level of educational services they re-
ceived. It should be noted, however, that under the
State plan, local overrides to increase educational
expenditures were permitted. See Analysis of the Bud-
get Bill, California State Legislature, Sacramento, 1978,
p.720.
18. The localities also have control over a modest
General Relief Program. However, the amounts here
are too small to warrant explicit discussion.
19. "Recent National, Regional and International De-
velopments", Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco,
September 5, 1978.
20. Legislative Analyst, "An Analysis ofProposition 13:
The Jarvis-Gann Property Tax Initiative", Sacramento,
May, 1978.
21. Since the California Board of Equalization makes
annual surveys of assessment ratios, one would have
expected such widespread underassessment to show
up in their data. However, figuresforfiscal year1977-78
only indicated underassessment of 8 percent in terms
of current prices. See Annual Report, State Board of
Equalization, 1976-77.
22. Total assessments for 1978-79 were $116.2 billion
compared with the estimate of $108.1 billion. At a tax
rate of$5 per $100 valuation, the extra$8.1 billion would
yield $405 million.
23. Excluding Special Districts, for which data were
unavailable, non-property tax receipts grew as follows:
1974-75-1975-76-12.6%; 1975-76-1976-77-10.2%;
1976-77-1978-79-20.7%.
24. The 55 percent wage share was taken from Govern-
mental Finances, op. cit., p. 30.
25. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Public Employment in
1976.
26. A survey by the Los Angeles Times showed that
California cities increased expenditure by 4.6 percent
and counties by 5.3 percent over 1977-78 levels. By our
estimates such increases were sufficient to maintain
real 1977-78 spending levels. Los Angeles Times, Oc-
tober 1, 1978.
27. The City Auditor is quoted as saying that the City
"would probably have a surplus of $51 million", San
Francisco Chronicle, September 6, 1978.28. The situation with the San Francisco 'Unified
School District is similar. The budget for 1978-79 actu-
ally appears to be higher than for the preceding year.
29. Legislative Analyst, op. cit.
30. Of course, because of the progressivity of the
income tax, effective rates increase.
31. This assumes locally raised revenue also grows at
without-Amendment rates. Otherwise, the 2 percent-
agepoints is addedtothe gap leftbythe latterrevenues.
See below.
32. Study by San Mateo County Manager, May 8,1978.
While one would expect turnover rates to be reduced
somewhat because reassessment is triggered by trans-
fer, the effect is likely to be small. Most property trans-
fers involveemploymenttransfers, retirement, ordeath.
Moreover, the maximum savings from maintaining
ownership is 1 percent of the value of the home-a
figure which may be small compared to the benefits of
upgrading one's housing.
33. To arrive at this figure the shortfall in relief growth
of2percentage points mustbe translated intoafraction
of total local revenue. This is done by observing that
State relief is 70 percent of the size oflocal propertytax
receipts. Hence, the shortfall in State relief isequivalent
to a 1.4 percentage point shortfall in property tax
receipts. Since property taxes constitute 20 percent of
local revenues, we have a revenue shortfall of .28
percent because of State relief. The latter is then added
to the reassessment result and rounded.
34. There is some reason to believe, however, that the
figures in Table 7 may overstate the effects of the
Amendment on education finance. In response to the
Serrano decision the State had decided to redistribute
property tax receipts among local school districts be-
ginning with fiscal year 1978-79. Because of the limita-
tion on the level of property taxes imposed by Jarvis-
Gann, this action had to be shelved. Strictly speaking
those funds which were to be redistributed should be
counted as State as opposed to local funds. Unfortu-
nately, estimates of the extent of such redistribution
were not available at the time this paper was written.
35. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Rela-
tions, op. cit.
36. This home-rule effect of Proposition 13 is rein-
forced by the Serrano school finance decision, which
requires greater uniformity of expenditures among
school districts.
37. While any of the major State taxes could, in princi-
ple, be cut, the California Legislature has cut income
taxes three times in the past decade. It seems reason-
able, therefore, to view income taxes as the marginal
instrument.
38. Recently, it has been argued that the incidence of
the property tax rests upon the owners of capital.
However, this outcome is based upon the premise ofa
nationally applicable property tax. Since the case at
hand is restricted to a single state, its major conse-
quences will be upon output and input prices, as the
orthodox theory would predict.
39. An exception is with aid to education. Here relief
was allocated according to a complex formula which
reflected an attempt to equalize resources between
school districts. See SB 154, California State Legisla-
ture, 1978.
40. Unless the suburb was located in another county.
Note that city-counties such as San Francisco obtain
no benefit from this provision.
41. Since the relief measure is forthe fi rst year onIy, it is
conceivable thatthe State Legislature mightchange the
distribution formula in future relief measures. For ex-
ample, county property tax revenues could be divided
among local units in proportion to a unit's share of
aggregate assessments. Because the jurisdictional
boundaries of many local units overlap, however, such
an approach might produce nonsensical results. More-
over, if the objective of the relief was to minimize
disruption of public service flows, the present alloca-
tion formula may be optimal.
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